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Introduction
In July 2001 as part of a comprehensive new policy
Portugal decriminalised use, acquisition and possession
of all illicit drugs when conducted for personal use.
Sales of all illicit drugs remained as criminal offences.
Ten years on, the reform has attracted considerable
international attention. It has also been the subject of a
number of divergent accounts on its impacts, with some
commentators offering diametrically opposed policy
conclusions from their evidence-informed analyses.
Consequently, this is a policy choice that has been
deemed both a ‘disastrous failure’ [1] and a ‘resounding
success’ [2]. As two of the participants in this debate we
know that drug law reform is invariably difficult to
study, and involves sifting through multiple versions of
evidence, but the divergences, contested debates and
assertions of ‘deceit’, ‘misinformation’ and ‘manipula-
tion’ (see e.g. [1,3–5]) have given rise to a clear example
of ‘duelling certitudes’ [6] which is both frustrating and
instructive. In an era where evidence, defined here as
the body of putatively valid and reliable knowledge
about drug use and related harms, is often implied to be
the tested, trustworthy tool for generating policies
‘devoid of dogma’ [7], this case study provides a much
needed opportunity to examine the way all sides of the
drug policy debate can call upon and alternatively use
or misuse evidence to feed into discussions of the
worth, efficacy and desirability of different illicit drug
policies.
In this paper we aim:
• To outline the two most divergent accounts on the
Portuguese reform: the ‘disastrous failure’ and the
‘resounding success’.
• To compare and contrast how they have dealt with
the three most contested claims surrounding the
reform.
• To demonstrate (by re-contextualising the
accounts against the available evidence) how evi-
dence has been used and misused and correct
misinformation.
• To discuss the implications of this case study for
the generation of evidence-based drug policy.
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Anyone familiar with the Portuguese decriminalisa-
tion would be aware that this is a reform for which there
are numerous contested claims: such as that this reform
has both reduced [2,8] and increased HIV [1], and
increased [1] and reduced [8] the burden on the Por-
tuguese prison system. Three claims have received
much greater notoriety and warrant particular scrutiny
in this article: impacts on the prevalence and pattern of
illicit drug use; the number of deaths that can be attrib-
uted to drug use; and the Portuguese drug situation,
relative to the rest of Europe.
The Portuguese reform:The evidence base
While the Portuguese decriminalisation took place in
2001, to date there have been only two internal and one
external evaluations conducted. All were carried out as
part of broader drug strategy examinations and have
had little to say about the legislative reform [9–11].This
is not to say there is no evidence base on the reform.
For example, annual reports, in both Portuguese and
English, continue to be released every year and outline
the latest knowledge on the drug situation (for the most
recent see [12,13]). Moreover, many data gaps that
existed at the time of reform have been filled, because of
new studies and improved methodologies.Yet the high-
level interest and absence of specific evaluations by the
Portuguese government has contributed to the some-
what unusual situation where accounts of the reform
have been published by various and predominantly
external stakeholders, including the RAND institute
[14,15], and the Beckley Foundation, which was
authored by ourselves [16]. The two most prominent
and divergent accounts, which form the basis for analy-
sis in this article, have been published by the Cato
Institute (a US libertarian think tank) [2] and the Asso-
ciação para uma Portugal Livre de Drogas (APLD—
Association for a Drug Free Portugal) [1]. More recent
outputs include a short commissioned piece by Portu-
guese harm reduction officials [17,18] and our own
peer-reviewed account [8]. Table 1 provides a time line
of these and other key commentaries on the reform.
The Cato report and the APLD report
The Cato report was written by a constitutional lawyer
Glenn Greenwald [2] following a 3 week visit to Por-
tugal to conduct interviews with stakeholders (the
number and nature of interviews have not been publicly
specified) and entitled ‘Drug decriminalization in Por-
tugal: Lessons for creating fair and successful drug
policies’. The report’s most widely publicised conclu-
sion was that: ‘the data show that, judged by virtually
every metric, the Portuguese decriminalization frame-
work has been a resounding success’ and that it was a
model with ‘self-evident lessons that should guide drug
policy debates around the world’ [2].The launch of the
Cato report generated substantial (and supportive)
media attention, including coverage by Time Magazine
[19], the Economist [20], Scientific American [21] and
the Moderate Voice [22].
The APLD report was written by Dr Manuel Pinto
Coehlo, a Portuguese abstinence-based drug treatment
provider and Chair of APLD. Pinto’s main report was
Table 1. Time line of key events regarding discussion of the
Portuguese reform
Date Event
November 2000 Lei n.° 30/2000, de 29 de Novembro
adopted
1 July 2001 Decriminalisation occurred
February 2002 RAND report released—‘Guidelines for
implementing and evaluating the
Portuguese drug policy’
December 2004 National evaluations by INA and IDT
released—‘Avaliação da Estratégia
Nacional da Luta Contra a Droga
1999–2003’
December 2007 Beckley Foundation report
released—‘The effects of
decriminalization of drug use in
Portugal’
2 April 2009 Launch of Cato report—‘Drug
decriminalization in Portugal: lessons
for creating fair and successful drug
policies’
7–27 April 2009 Widespread media coverage of Cato
report—including Time Magazine,
Scientific American, The ModerateVoice
and The Economist
May 2009 2009 World Drug Report released and
claimed Portuguese reform appeared
to be working
September 2009 First Pinto piece in Portuguese
blog—‘Descriminalização das drogas
em Portugal—O retrato factual’
February 2010 First English piece by Pinto published on
World Federation Against Drugs
(WFAD) website—‘Decriminalization
of drugs in Portugal—the real facts!’
July 2010 British Journal of Criminology article by
Hughes and Stevens published—‘What
can we learn from the Portuguese
decriminalization of illicit drugs?’
August 2010 Pinto main report published on WFAD
website—‘The “resounding success”
of Portuguese drug policy: the power
of an attractive fallacy’
September 2010 British Medical Journal commissioned
piece published—‘Drug
decriminalisation in Portugal’
IDT, Instituto da Droga e daToxicodependência (Institute for
Drugs and Drug Addiction); INA, Instituto Nacional de
Administração (National Institute for Public Administration).
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titled ‘The “resounding success” of Portuguese drug
policy: The power of an attractive fallacy’ [1]. Other
outputs, essentially smaller versions of this main report,
have included: ‘Decriminalization of drugs in
Portugal—The real facts!’ [23], ‘Britain should not
make the same mistakes as Portugal’ [24] and ‘Best
Portugal advice to the world: Don’t follow us’ [25], all
of which came to the damning conclusion that the
reform was a ‘disastrous’ failure [1] that ‘should not be
followed by anyone’ [26]. The reports received less
immediate attention, but have been widely dissemi-
nated by drug-free proponents, including World Fed-
eration Against Drugs (WFAD), Europe Against Drugs
(EURAD), Drug Free Australia and Drug Free
America in international blogs (see e.g. [5]) and media
(see e.g. [27]). Consequently, as one critic noted these
arguments now ‘lurk in almost every corner of the
internet’ where the Portuguese law reform is discussed
[3]. Here we compare and contrast their accounts of the
three most contested claims.
Drug use
The ‘resounding success’
According to Greenwald [2], ‘none of the nightmare
scenarios touted by predecriminalization opponents—
(including) rampant increases in drug usage . . . oc-
curred’. Instead drug usage ‘declined in many key
categories’. Evidence put forward was that among both
students in the 7–9th and the 10–12th grades, there
were reductions, between 2001 and 2006, in lifetime
prevalence for ‘virtually every substance’. For example,
figures demonstrated that lifetime cannabis use
decreased from 10.4% to 6.6% among 7–9th grade (a
36% reduction) and from 25.6% to 18.7% among
10–12th grade students (a 27% reduction).
For older groups Greenwald noted that there was a
‘slight to mild’ increase in lifetime drug usage between
2001 and 2007, but argued that due to cohort effects
‘increases in lifetime prevalence rates amongst the
general population is inevitable in most nations, regard-
less of drug policy and regardless of whether there is an
actual increase in drug usage’ [2]. Greenwald empha-
sised that the most dramatic trend was a reduction
among those who were most likely to take up illicit drugs
(those aged 15–19). He thus concluded that the reform
had elicited ‘no adverse effects on drug usage rates’ [2].
The ‘disastrous failure’
According to Pinto, there were no reductions in drug
use. Instead, drug use increased substantially post-
reform. Evidence highlighted included that among
school students there was ‘an increase in every drug
category from 1998 to 2002, with cannabis sky-
rocketing the charts with its 150% raise’ [1]. He noted
a slight decrease to 2006 (for all drugs excepting
heroin) but to levels that remained much higher than
pre-reform.
Moreover, Pinto concluded that there were ‘large’
and not ‘slight to mild’ increases in lifetime prevalence.
Evidence put forward was a 50% increase for the
20–24 year age group between 2001 and 2007 [1]. He
also noted that when looking at lifetime prevalence
among the general population (aged 15–64) ‘there
wasn’t a single drug category, not one, that has
decreased since 2001’.
Accounts compared to the available evidence
Examining trends in drug use among school students,
there is evidence to support both Pinto’s claimed
increase and Greenwald’s claimed decrease. The
problem is threefold: first, four datasets have evolved for
collecting information on drug use among school stu-
dents in Portugal (see Table 2 for an overview of each
dataset), but Greenwald used only Inquérito Nacional
em Meio Escolar (INME) data and Pinto only Health
Behaviour in School-aged Children (HSBC) data. Each
thus afforded a different, but partial picture.
Second, the adopted datasets represented extreme
interpretations of lifetime drug use trends among Por-
tuguese school students, both at the time of reform and
post-reform. This is exemplified in Figure 1, outlining
trends for lifetime use of cannabis (the drug for which
there was most change) by dataset. According to the
longest and arguably most reliable dataset collected on
school drug use patterns in Portugal [European School
Survey Project on Alcohol and other Drugs (ESPAD)],
lifetime cannabis use increased at the time of reform by
60% [31], not 142% as suggested by Pinto’s HSBC
data [28–30]. Examining trends post-reform, according
to Greenwald’s INME data there was a 27–30% reduc-
tion in lifetime cannabis use [34,35], yet all other
datasets suggests there was a 16% reduction [31–33].
That is, the available data indicates a much less dra-
matic shift than proffered in either account, with only a
moderate increase in reported lifetime cannabis use
around or immediately post-reform, then a subsequent,
albeit slight decline.
Third, neither Pinto nor Greenwald took into
account trends in recent cannabis use. Yet this data
indicate sizeable post-reform declines in reported last
30 day use of cannabis (such as 20–30% in INME data
[34,35] and 32% in HSBC data [28]). Incorporating
these data indicates that the moderate rise in student’s
reported lifetime cannabis use around the time of the
reform reflected predominantly short-term, experimen-
tal use, which subsided in the years following reform.
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Table 2. Datasets on drug use among Portuguese school students showing target population and years and indicators collected
Dataset Target Years Indicators
ESPAD—European School
Survey Project on Alcohol
and other Drugs [31]
Students aged 16 in




Lifetime use of any illicit substance, cannabis
& any drug other than cannabis
Last 30 days use of cannabis (only)
ECATD—Estudo sobre o
Consumo de Álcool,
Tabaco e Droga, em
alunos do ensino público
[32,33]
Students aged 13–19 years,
by year of age
2003 and 2006 Lifetime use of any drug, cannabis, heroin,
amphetamines, cocaine, ecstasy, GHB,
LSD and hallucinogenic mushrooms
Last 30 day use and frequency of use in last









Lifetime use of cannabis, heroin,
amphetamines, cocaine, ecstasy & LSD
Last year and last 30 days use of cannabis
(only)
INME—Inquérito Nacional
em Meio Escolar [34,35]
Students in middle school
(7th, 8th & 9th grades)
and upper school (10th,
11th & 12th grades)
2001 and 2006 Lifetime use, last year and last 30 days use of
any drug, cannabis, heroin, amphetamines,
cocaine, ecstasy, LSD and hallucinogenic
mushrooms
GHB, gamma-hydroxybutyrate; LSD, lysergic acid diethylamide.
Figure 1. Lifetime prevalence of cannabis among Portuguese school students, by year and survey.
HSBC/WHO: Health Behaviour in School-aged Children/World Health Organization. Source: Matos et al. (2000, 2008) [28,29];
Matos (2003) [30].
ESPAD: European School Survey Project on Alcohol and other Drugs. Source: Hibell et al. (2009) [31].
ECTAD: Estudo sobre o Consumo de Álcool,Tabaco e Droga, em alunos do ensino público. Source: Feijão and Lavado (2003) [32];
Feijão (2009) [33].
INME: Inquérito Nacional em Meio Escolar. Source: Feijão and Lavado (2004) [34]; Feijão (2008) [35].
N.B. Only HSBC/WHO and ESPAD data were collected pre- and post-reform (2001).
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Examining trends in the general population, there
were clear increases between 2001 and 2007 in
reported lifetime use for most age groups and most
illicit substances [36,37]. In this regard Pinto is correct
that the Cato report was overly optimistic. However,
Pinto ignored notable reductions in the 15–19 age
group and failed to mention the size of the increases,
which in many cases were unlikely to be statistically
significant (e.g. an increase in reported lifetime
amphetamines use from only 0.5% to 0.9%).
The key question—that neither Greenwald nor Pinto
addressed—is to what extent lifetime prevalence pro-
vides a meaningful indicator of changing drug use
among the general population, and hence the extent to
which this indicator ought to be relied upon for assess-
ments of change in post-reform Portugal.While lifetime
prevalence is deemed useful for examining trends in
youth, the general consensus of organisations, including
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [38],
the World Health Organization [39] and European
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
(EMCDDA), is that the best indicators for examining
trends in adults and/or the general population are
recent (last 12 months) or current (last 30 days) use
provide much better indicators. For example, as noted
by the EMCDDA:
Of the three standard time frames used for reporting
survey data, lifetime prevalence (use of a drug at any
point in one’s life) is the broadest. This measure does
not reflect the current drug use situation (among
adults) . . . [40] (emphasis added).
Indicators of lifetime use are thus likely to miss recent
changes in the scale of drug use in Portugal.
As shown in Figure 2, general population (aged
15–64) trends for recent and current drug use in Por-
tugal indicate minimal if any changes between 2001
and 2007 [36,37]. Instead, rates of discontinuation of
drug use (the proportion of the population that
reported ever having used a drug but opting not to in
recent years) increased [36,37], which reinforces that
just as in the school populations, the growth in lifetime-
reported use reflected predominantly short-term
experimental use. Increases in recent and current drug
use were more notable in some cohorts, particularly
those aged 25 to 34 (albeit, with a maximum of 7% of
any one cohort reporting recent use, absolute levels
remained low). But as shown in Figure 3, recent and
current drug use declined among those aged 15–24, the
population who were most at risk of initiation and
long-term engagement. The available evidence thus
gives grounds for arguing that while there was some
growth in the scale of drug use in post-reform Portugal,




According to the Cato report the reform led to marked
improvements in drug-related deaths. Namely, in the
lead up to decriminalisation there had been significant
increases in drug-related problems, including a 10-fold
Figure 2. Prevalence of lifetime, recent (last 12 months) and current (last month) use of any illicit drug in Portugal among individuals
aged 15–64 in 2001 and 2007. Source: Balsa et al. (2004, 2007) [36,37].
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increase in ‘acute drug-related deaths’, but ‘the total
number of drug-related deaths actually decreased from
the predecriminalization year of 1999 (when it totalled
close to 400) to 2006 (when the total was 290)’ [2].The
report emphasised that such success was in spite of
increasing the number of toxicological examinations
(and hence the likelihood of recording a positive drug-
related death), and that positive outcomes were observ-
able across all drugs: ‘for every prohibited substance
(deaths) have either declined significantly or remained
constant compared to 2001’ [2].
The ‘disastrous failure’
The Pinto report emphasised that there had been no
decrease in drug-related deaths: to the contrary ‘the
opposite occurred’ [1]. He noted that the number of
deceased individuals that tested positive for drugs had
increased 45% between 2006 and 2007 (from 216 to
314), which meant drug-related deaths were the highest
since 2001 (280). Pinto [1] reported that not only had
there been a rise in drug-related deaths, but ‘since
decriminalization has been implemented in July 2001,
the number of homicides related to drugs has increased
40%’.
Accounts compared to the available evidence
Examining the National Institute of Forensic Medicine
(INML) data on drug-related deaths, there was as
Pinto reported a substantial rise in recent years, par-
ticularly from 2006 to 2007 (data that were included by
Greenwald for discussions on drug use, but excluded
for deaths), but rates were also as Greenwald reported
much lower than pre-decriminalisation days (1999).Yet
neither account grasped the full picture for two key
reasons. First, Pinto focused only on the short-term
patterns (e.g. the 45% increase from 2006 to 2007),
whereas Greenwald focused on longer-term patterns
(e.g. 1999 to 2005–2006) albeit he did not mention the
period in between (particularly 2002 to 2004 when
reported deaths were at their lowest recorded). Equally
Figure 3. Prevalence of lifetime, recent (last 12 months) and current (last month) use of any illicit drug in Portugal, by age group in 2001
and 2007. Source: Balsa et al. (2004, 2007) [36,37].
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if not more importantly, the accounts had differential
appreciations of the weaknesses of the adopted indica-
tor for reporting on deaths attributable to illicit drug
use.
Unlike much of the Western world, Portugal has not
historically collected or reported information on deaths
that are directly attributable to drug intoxication.
Indeed, information on ‘overdose’ only became avail-
able in November 2010 (following calls by the
EMCDDA and Instituto da Droga e da Toxicode-
pendência (IDT) for harmonisation and improvement
of indicators of drug-related deaths) [12]. Until
recently the primary indicator ‘drug-related deaths’ has
been produced by the INML and defined as the
number of deaths that involve a positive post-mortem
toxicological test for the presence of illicit substances
[12]. It is the only data available before and after the
reform, but it has two major limitations. First, as noted
by Greenwald, it is responsive to changes in recording
practices, such as the number of toxicological autop-
sies. Second, it is only an indirect indicator of attribut-
able death; many people are found to have traces of a
drug in their body when they die, but this does not
mean that the drug caused the death. This is why the
standard international classification of drug-related
death relies on reports by physicians on their assess-
ment of the cause of death, not positive toxicological
tests [41].
The data weaknesses and a substantial rise in toxico-
logical autopsies from 2005 to 2009 give merit for
suggesting that as argued by both Greenwald and our
own account [8], the rise in ‘positive post-mortem toxi-
cological tests’ may have been largely spurious. Yet
neither the possibility of a spurious change nor substan-
tial changes in recording practices were mentioned in
the Pinto accounts.
Data from the National Statistics Institute (INE) has
recently been made available and backdated from 2001
onwards. This provides a more accurate indicator of
drug-attributable death as it refers to the number of
people that have been determined by doctors accord-
ing to International Classification of Diseases protocols
Figure 4. Drug-related deaths in Portugal between 2000 and 2008 using National Institute of Forensic Medicine (INML) definition
(positive post-mortem toxicological test for drugs) and National Statistics Institute (INE) definition (determination by physician according
to International Classification of Diseases criteria that death was attributable to drugs). Source: Instituto da Droga e da Toxicodependência
(2009, 2010) [12,42].
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to have died due to drugs [12]. INE data support the
hypothesis that the reported rise in the INML data was
spurious as the number of people determined by phy-
sicians to have died due to drug use decreased from
2001, with a slight increase from 2005 to 2008/9 (to
levels that remain much lower than at the time of
decriminalisation) [12,42] (see Figure 4).This is not to
say that decreases are attributable solely to the reform,
with the expanded services a more plausible explana-
tion, but a key goal of the reform had been to reduce
social stigma and thereby facilitate access to Portu-
guese drug treatment and harm reduction services. As
shown in Hughes and Stevens [8] drug treatment
access in Portugal expanded considerably post-reform.
This provides partial evidence that the reform may
have contributed to the observed declines.
Examining the other assertion by Pinto of a 40%
rise in ‘drug-related homicides’ in post-reform Portu-
gal, it is clear that this was based on a false attribution
to the World Drug Report. The data referred to all
homicides, that is, any intentional killing of a person,
including murder, manslaughter, euthanasia and
infanticide [43]. The 2009 World Drug Report [44]
merely speculated that the rise ‘might be related’ to
drug trafficking activity:
While cocaine seizures in a number of European
countries increased sharply during that period, in
2006, Portugal suddenly had the sixth-highest
cocaine seizure total in the world. The number of
murders increased 40% during this same period of
time, a fact that might be related to the trafficking
activity. Although the rate remains low and Lisbon is
one of Europe’s safest cities, Portugal was the only
European country to show a significant increase in
murder during this period.
There is no way of grounding or assessing whether
the rise in homicides was drug-related or, if they were,
whether they were attributable to the reform. Indeed, a
striking omission from the Pinto assertions has been
attention to the proposed causal mechanism (and its
validity or lack thereof). For example, is it reasonable to
assume that decriminalisation of penalties for minor
drug use offences, in the absence of any legislative
change for traffickers, would have a detectable effect on
drug-related homicide? A much more plausible hypoth-
esis is that this association is an artefact of increased
European demand for cocaine and geography: namely
that Portugal is one of two main gateways through
which cocaine flows into Europe [40]. This leads us to
conclude that assertions of a rise in drug-related homi-
cide have questionable validity. They also run counter
to our earlier reported trend that drug-related crime
reduced, rather than increased post-reform [8].
How Portugal compares to the rest of Europe?
The ‘resounding success’
According to the Cato report, post-reform Portugal
fared very well compared to other European nations,
the USA and Australia. For example, Greenwald [2]
noted that ‘for the period 2001–2005, Portugal—for the
15–64 age group—has the absolute lowest lifetime
prevalence rate for cannabis . . . in the EU’. This was
backed up by a figure demonstrating that Portugal had
a lower general population lifetime prevalence for can-
nabis than Denmark, the UK, France, Belgium,
Ireland, Spain, Germany, Netherlands, Norway,
Greece, Luxembourg, Sweden and Finland. He also
noted that ‘subsequent to decriminalization in Portu-
gal, for almost every narcotic, the lifetime prevalence
rates . . . is far lower in Portugal than in Europe gener-
ally’ and that included nations with ‘some with the
harshest criminalization schemes in the EU’ [2]. The
message was clear: Portugal’s success stood at odds
with Europe and the rest of world.
The ‘disastrous failure’
In contrast, Pinto claimed that post-reform Portugal
fared very poorly relative to the rest of Europe. Evi-
dence put forward was that ‘behind Luxembourg, Por-
tugal has the highest rate of consistent drug users and
IV heroin dependents’ in Europe [1]. He also noted
that Portugal had one of the worst levels of drug-related
deaths, prevalence of drug-related HIV and that it was
the ‘only European country’ that experienced a rise in
‘drug-related homicides’ between 2001 and 2006. He
thus concluded that far from a success, the Portuguese
decriminalisation was a disastrous failure.
Accounts compared to the available evidence
Greenwald and Pinto were both correct that it is impor-
tant to compare Portugal against other, particularly
European, nations otherwise there is no counterfactual.
Yet, Greenwald examined Portugal’s ranking regarding
the prevalence of drug use, especially cannabis and
cocaine, whereas Pinto examined ranking regarding the
prevalence of problematic drug use, drug-related
deaths, homicides and HIV. Even then, some clear
errors were made in comparisons. For example, Green-
wald [2] asserted Portugal had the ‘absolute lowest
lifetime prevalence rates for cannabis . . .’ (when Bul-
garia, Malta and Romania all had lower lifetime preva-
lence than Portugal) [45]. Pinto [1] asserted that with
‘eight times the (European) average’ Portugal had the
highest number of new cases of injecting drug user-
related HIV/AIDS in Europe (omitting to mention that,
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as emphasised by the EMCDDA [45], data were
unavailable for two of the nations which have histori-
cally had the highest rates of HIV/AIDS—Spain and
Estonia).
The latest data indicate that in Europe, Portugal
continues to be one of the countries with the lowest
lifetime prevalence of cannabis, but it is by no means
the lowest country [45]. A more pertinent statistic is
that compared to other European and non-European
countries (see Table 3), Portugal has low annual preva-
lence of cannabis and cocaine use, but fairs less well in
regard to opiates and problematic drug use [40,46].
Portugal also continues to have high, drug-related mor-
tality and injecting drug user-related HIV and AIDS,
albeit not the highest prevalence. For example, in 2008,
Portugal had among injecting drug users the third
highest rate of HIV (behind Spain and Latvia) and
fourth highest incidence of new cases of HIV [40].
The question is: how meaningful is this information
for determining the effects of the reform? Portugal has
historically had very low prevalence of drug use and was
one of the last European nations to experience signifi-
cant increases in heroin use. During the 1990s it had
very high prevalence of all the indicators referred to by
Pinto (excepting homicides). It is only by taking into
account rates pre-reform—or more preferably trends
pre- and post-reform—that we can examine the extent
to which Portugal’s current drug situation, relative to
the rest of Europe, can be attributed to the reform.
Our article examined trends in Portugal relative to
Spain and Italy (chosen for their similarity in geogra-
phy and drug situation) and concluded that post-
reform Portugal is similar or performing better for
most indicators. In relation to drug use we identified
that between 2001 and 2007 there were similar
increases in all three nations for lifetime and recent
drug use for cannabis and cocaine [8]. For school stu-
dents, lifetime prevalence (using ESPAD data)
increased in all three nations from 1999 to 2003
before a drop in 2007, with the major difference being
that in Portugal, the drop in reported use of any illicit
substance appeared more pronounced and the decline
in reported cannabis use appeared less pronounced.
Significantly, Portugal was the only nation to exhibit
declines in problematic drug use.
Regarding drug-related deaths, Portugal, Spain and
Italy had different trends, reflecting the different stages
of the heroin epidemic, but ‘it is clear that since the
Portuguese introduction of its drug strategy and the
decriminalization, all three nations showed declines in
drug-related deaths, but that the declines were more
pronounced in Portugal and Italy than in Spain’ [8].
The main point of difference was that Portugal alone
showed an increase in drug-related mortality in 2007
and 2008; however, as illustrated earlier this was attrib-
uted to the increase in toxicological autopsies. The
more recently available INE evidence largely supports
this attribution. Broader examination of the EMCDDA
reports and data supports our earlier conclusion that
post-reform Portugal is performing—longitudinally—
similarly or slightly better than most European
countries.
Discussion
The Greenwald and Pinto accounts both attempted to
demonstrate their grounding in the evidence (Green-
wald arguably more so due to greater use of figures),
and that they were letting the evidence speak for itself.
For example, Pinto [1] concludes ‘it’s rather simple and
easy to grasp the reality of the facts, with one look at the
real figures, the official figures. Still Mr. Glenn Green-
wald managed to picture it otherwise . . .’ Yet, by out-
lining both accounts, and the choices that they made in
presenting data, we found clear proof of misuse. Both
showed selective use of evidence (focusing on different
indicators, choice of years or datasets) and omission or
a lack of acknowledgement of other pieces of the
puzzle. Both also showed differential appreciations of
data strengths and weaknesses: with weaknesses high-
lighted mainly by Greenwald to account for apparent
failings. In so doing, both provided a version of events
that offered certitude [6] and support for opposing
‘core beliefs’ [47].
The promulgation of errors in public discourse can
be seen to have both advantages and disadvantages for
participants in policy debates. On the one hand, Por-
tugal may not have received the same level of interna-
tional attention if it were not for such accounts. For
Table 3. Annual prevalence of use as a percentage of the
population aged 15–64, by drug type and country
Region Country Cannabis Cocaine Opiates
Europe Albania 1.8 0.8 0.45
Estonia 6.0 0.6 1.52
France 8.6 0.6 0.47
Italy 14.6 2.2 0.72
Netherlands 5.4 0.6 0.31
Portugal 3.6 0.6 0.46
Spain 10.1 3.0 0.13




Oceania Australia 10.6 1.9 0.40
New Zealand 14.6 0.6 1.10
Americas Canada 13.6 1.9 0.50
USA 12.5 2.6 0.58
Source: World Drug Report (2010) [38].
A resounding success or a disastrous failure 109
© 2012 Australasian Professional Society on Alcohol and other Drugs
example, our earlier Beckley report [16] flew under the
media radar—perhaps because its claims were more
tentative and indeed at that time rather pessimistic
about some implementation problems. There is no
doubt that the different accounts led to much greater
awareness of the Portuguese reform. The number of
mentions in the international press can be clearly seen
in Figure 5 as having undergone a dramatic increase,
with 49% of the 415 media mentions of Portugal’s
reform having occurred in 2009 and 2010 [48]. While
the Greenwald report or conclusions are by far the most
referred to, other accounts have also received interna-
tional coverage.
Increased awareness has moreover opened up oppor-
tunities for more nuanced and detailed learning. For
example, the publicity has fuelled visits by other nations
wanting to know more about how the reform works and
its impacts, including officials from Norway, Peru,
Columbia, Mexico, the USA,Vietnam, Czech Republic
and Argentina. And even the presence of accounts with
selective use of evidence has inevitably led to airing of
some different points of view, opening up space for a
more reasoned debate and active engagement with the
evidence and qualified spokespeople.
On the other hand, the misuse of evidence has fuelled
clear misconceptions about the reform. Even a brief
review of public debates can show the uptake of some
erroneous accounts. In the 2010 Californian ballot pro-
posal for the legalisation of marijuana (Proposition 19),
proponents [49], media [50–52] and the Californian
Independent Voter Network (a network committed to
non-partisan and unbiased discussion of issues affect-
ing Californian voters) [53] cited Portugal as proof that
reform did not lead to increased drug use. The former
President of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso [54],
has also been reported to have accepted the argument
that ‘overall drug use fell’. Pinto [1] contends that the
‘misleading’ accounts of the reform by Greenwald, our-
selves and a never published report by Danny Kushlick
have contributed towards the copying of the Portuguese
model in Czech Republic, Mexico and Argentina.While
it is highly questionable that an unpublished account
and our article (published for only 2 months at the
time) led directly to reform in these countries, the
assertion that erroneous accounts could give rise to
reform is a concern, particularly given the comments of
people like the former President of Brazil.
Erroneous accounts can also shift the debate on how
reforms are spoken of and expectations about the out-
comes of policy transfer. One questionable assumption
is that, relative to other countries, Portugal’s current
drug situation is because of the reform. This argument
has been taken up by proponents and opponents alike
(see e.g. Calvina Fay, executive director of Drug Free
America [27]). The emphasis upon rankings, rather
than trends, is damaging because there is no direct,
cross-sectional link between national drug policies and
prevalence of use [55]. Apart from the decriminalisa-
tion, there are many other factors that might explain
national patterns of use (including disposable income,
leisure time, religiosity and other cultural norms) and
trends in drug-related harms (including changes in the
availability of treatment and harm reduction services
and the level of health-care and welfare support) [56].
Figure 5. Media counts of Portugal, drug and decriminalization/decriminalization from 2001 to 2010. Source: Factiva (retrieved 26
February 2011), Dow Jones Reuters Business Interactive (2011) [48].
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More broadly the overemphasis by both Greenwald and
Pinto on the reform, and not the concurrent drug strat-
egy which expanded services for drug users in Portugal,
has fostered overconfident assertions about the effects
of the reform and a lack of appreciation of the Portu-
guese model and the causal mechanisms by which
outputs and outcomes could be expected to occur.
Finally and perhaps most dangerously, accounts such
as these, and the high-level involvement by competing
policy advocates in promoting these accounts, can con-
tribute to disengagement or lack of interest in the avail-
able evidence. For example, an American journalist,
Keith O’Brien, concluded that the Portuguese decrimi-
nalisation has become ‘something of a Rorschach test
where people . . . can look at these numbers and make
almost whatever argument they’d like to make’ [57].
Politicians and advocates can in turn draw upon the
accounts that most suit their particular interests (see
e.g. the competing use of accounts in a British House of
Lords debate [58]). A real fear is that the multitude of
different accounts and their continued fuelling will lead
to the dismissal of other more evidence-informed
accounts. One purported example of evidence dismissal
comes from the US Office for National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP) [59]. While this report does not
appear on the ONDCP website and the only source
that we could find is Dr Pinto Coelho himself, the
central conclusions about the Portuguese reform are
instructive:
Supporting analysis is not definitive . . . Core drug
use claims are not conclusive . . . For now, this much
can be said—drug legalization advocates’ claims
regarding the impact of Portugal’s drug policy have
significantly exceeded the existing scientific basis
[60].
The fact that attention was drawn to the reform and
then ‘discounted’ by the apparent misuse of evidence
appears a wasted opportunity, not least of all because
more evidence-informed conclusions provide ample
indication of a successful reform.This is not to say it is
impossible to reinsert evidence; indeed, there are some
signs that our more moderate claims may be gaining
traction. For example, in their call for nations to replace
the criminalisation and punishment of drug use, the
Global Commission on Drugs Policy made the very
important acknowledgement that the Portuguese
reform was followed by slight increases in the prevalence
of overall drug use [61]. Yet, evidence fatigue and dis-
trust make it a harder battle, which means that propo-
nents of the ‘evidence’ will often have to firstly correct
misconceptions and reframe debates and/or win favour
of competing constituents (something that in itself may
lead to loss of credibility of ‘independent experts’).
Conclusion
The promulgation and uptake of different accounts of
the Portuguese reform is a clear indicator of the interest
in it. Considered analysis of the two most divergent
accounts reveals that the Portuguese reform warrants
neither the praise nor the condemnation of being a
‘resounding success’ or a ‘disastrous failure’, and that
these divergent policy conclusions were derived from
selective use of the evidence base that belie the
nuanced, albeit largely positive, implications from this
reform.
Given their potential for use in promoting or block-
ing drug law reform in Portugal and elsewhere, the
selective uses of data and divergent conclusions are
perhaps to be expected. Yet, while we found evidence
that the misinterpretation of evidence may garner
national or international support and contribute to
the uptake of misconceptions and erroneous accounts
(that may align with core beliefs), we contend that
particularly for proponents of reform, that is, those
challenging the status quo, deliberate misinterpreta-
tion of evidence is a high-risk game. The dissemina-
tion of incredibly certain [6] and overly positive
accounts provides easy grounds for discrediting
reforms, ignoring the lessons that they provide and
shifting public debate in directions that may prove
detrimental to future proponents.
More broadly, the dissemination of loose accounts
poses serious risks of devaluing the case for evidence-
based drug policy [7]. Indeed, the divergent accounts
of the Portuguese reform provide ample grounds for
questioning the implicit assumption that evidence will
generate policies ‘devoid of dogma’ [7]. At a time
when many countries in the developed world have
shifted electorally to the right, there may be a temp-
tation to throw evidence-based drug policy out, under
the pretext that science proves nothing at all. Careful
communication of claims is thus critical for both aca-
demics and advocates, so that evidence-informed
accounts are more than mere ammunition for the
policy battlefield.
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